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Abstract 
The public sector in the Nordic countries has been subject to substantial reform in recent 
decades. The article explores the changing reform dynamic in Denmark and Norway, 
focusing on centralising and decentralising trends in two prominent sectors: higher educa-
tion and health care. The main question is: How can the reform dynamics over the last 
decade explain changes surrounding decentralisation and/or re-centralisation? A new 
trend can be observed in both sectors, namely the rise of re-centralisation and the con-
comitant growth of state responsibility in matters pertaining to political and fiscal deci-
sion-making. Both hospitals and universities have been given increased (procedural) 
autonomy. At the same time there is stronger centralised planning and management of 
performance management, which means that (substantive) autonomy has been reduced. 
 
Introduction 
In the last two decades or so in the Nordic countries, substantial reforms of vari-
ous arms of the public sector have been undertaken. These have primarily been 
driven by an impetus to increase efficiency, accountability, user centeredness 
and responsiveness to societal demands (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011). In the 
public sector, the gradual but steady move from government to governance has 
implied shifts in the degrees of discretion or autonomy (Schmidtlein & Berdahl 
20051) enjoyed by service providers and other key actors at the system level 
(Kickert 1995, Saltman, Duran & Dubois, 2011). Comprehensive reform pres-
sures have challenged the Nordic welfare states, but also made them more sus-
tainable (Einhorn & Logue, 2010). Healthcare (HC) and higher education (HE) 
have also been affected, e.g. with regards to how the systems are structured, 
organised, managed and regulated, and how governance patterns have changed 
over time (Pierre, 2000).  During the rise of the welfare state, the dominant issue  
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in HE was to decentralise authority, whereas in HC the pendulum has moved 
back and forth between decentralisation and centralisation. However, in the last 
decade a new trend can be observed in both sectors: namely the rise of re-
centralisation or de-decentralisation and the concomitant growth of state respon-
sibility in matters pertaining to political and fiscal decision-making (Saltman, 
2008, Stensaker, 2014). Nevertheless, at the same time, managerial authority and 
operational decision-making has increasingly been decentralised (Saltman, 
Vrangbæk, Lehto & Winblad, 2012, Vukasovic, Maassen, Nerland, Pinheiro, 
Stensaker & Vabø, 2012). Given this, the remit of this paper is to both explore 
and compare the complex interplay between centraling and de-centralising gov-
ernance trends across HC and HE in Denmark and Norway. In doing so, we shed 
light on the main driving forces and consequences of this process, and highlight 
similarities and differences across the two sectors and national jurisdictions. 
Empirically, four aspects are analysed in detail (financing, structure, procedures, 
performance criteria) as pertaining to political, administrative and economic 
dimensions underpinning governance arrangements over time. 
 
Research questions and methods  
We address the following research questions: 
 
• How can historical shifts in the degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by higher education and healthcare providers be character-
ised? 
• What is the interplay between centralisation and decentrali-
sation? 
• How can shifts in the direction of de-centralisation and re-
centralisation be explained? 
 
The empirical, largely qualitative material draws upon existing literature on the 
topic and on ongoing and recent investigations by the authors, some of which are 
also comparative in scope. Primary sources include semi-structured interviews 
with system-wide stakeholders at various levels. Our method is comparative, and 
is aimed at describing and explaining recent and current developments across the 
two sectors or organisational fields (Pinheiro et al. 2016). The cultural differ-
ences between neighbouring Denmark and Norway are small (Hofstede, Hof-
stede & Minkov, 2010), with both countries possessing well-established welfare 
systems (Haave, 2008). Thus, we follow a most-similar case research design 
where the purpose is to accumulate knowledge and develop an in-depth analysis 
of recent developments regarding de- and re-centralising trends, and to develop 
new theoretical and empirical (comparative) insights on the changing nature of 
the (Nordic) welfare state.  
We resort to process tracing as an analytical tool for drawing descriptive 
causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence, understood as part of a 
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temporal sequence of events (Collier, 2011). Such events include, but are not 
limited to, ‘critical junctures’, and are essential building blocks of the historical 
institutional perspective which is our theoretical point of departure. We build on 
extant scholarship tracing decentralising-centralising reform trends in European 
HC and HE (Saltman, Bankauskaite & Vrangbæk, 2007, Saltman, 2008, Salt-
man, Duran & Dubois, 2011; Vukasovic, Maassen, Nerland, Pinheiro, Stensaker 
& Vabø 2015). That said, the primary foci of our analysis are on the macro-level 
(governance arrangements), rather than shedding light on dynamics at meso 
and/or micro levels, e.g. how institutions/actors respond to governance shifts. 
Agency issues are thus restricted to the role of the state as a collective actor, 
therein black-boxing organisational life (for a recent comparative analysis of HC 
and HE focusing on meso and micro-level dynamics, see Pinheiro, Geschwind, 
Ramirez & Vrangbæk, 2016).  
 
Changing governance in the Scandinavian welfare model 
from an historical institutionalism perspective 
Historical institutionalism (HI) provides the ability to analyse large reforms and 
structural changes, and carry out country comparisons (Tilly, 1984). Proponents 
of HI contend that political choices at one point in time will affect choices in the 
future (Steinmo, 2008). Reforms and changes tend to follow an evolutionary and 
incremental pattern, because actors are bound to historically drawn paths: “once 
policies are adopted and organizations are created those structures will persist 
until some major event – a punctuation in this equilibrium – occurs” (Peters, 
2013:80). Following Peters (2013:81) we argue that an institutional approach 
towards governance emphasies the predictability of policy responses within 
governance. The latter is conceived as a process in which the state plays a lead-
ing role in terms of setting priorities, defining objectives and coordinating activi-
ties (Pierre, 2000). Governance can take place by coercive and hierarchical steer-
ing, as well as “softer means” of coordination. In this way, governance reflects 
the transformation rather than the decline of the state (Ansell, 2002).  It is thus 
possible to influence, without coercion, since the underlying agencies and actors 
can govern themselves in accordance with state interests (Dean, 2010).  
Starting in the 1990s, the Scandinavian welfare states have undergone major 
transformations, with many neo-liberal reforms resulting in the introduction of 
new governance modes (Saltman, 2008). In the realms of HC and HE, these 
included the introduction of free choice and performance-based funding, in-
creased user fees, changes in leadership structures, benchmarking, quality audits, 
etc. More recently, both sectors have been challenged by the financial stringency 
resulting from the 2008 financial crisis (Vis, Kees, van Kersberg & Hylands, 
2011, Vrangbæk et al in this volume). Despite this, scholars suggest that the 
Nordic welfare model remains relatively robust, with the Nordic countries being 
on the leading edge in the wake of globalisation and increasing competition 
(Einhorn & Logue, 2010, Lehto, Vrangbæk & Winblad 2015). Cox (2004) ar-
gues that there is a strong commitment to the idea of the Nordic welfare model, 
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and that tendencies to expand its conceptions appear to be in accordance with the 
basic features and appropriate policy logics prevalent in the Scandinavian model. 
Thus, when taking into account new policy and reform initiatives, these are 
framed and interpreted in the light of core Scandinavian welfare-values, such as 
universalism, solidarity, democracy, tax-based funding, freedom from markets, 
and decentralised service delivery (Cox, 2004). Decentralised health and wel-
fare, operated by local government and local political bodies, is a core feature of 
the model (Haave, 2006), with HE run by central government agencies instead. 
The publicly operated and funded Nordic welfare/health and HE models have 
been under increasing reform pressures in recent decades, yet many of their 
traditional characteristics persist (Hagen & Vrangbæk, 2009; Pinheiro, 
Geschwind & Aarrevaara, 2014). Radical structural change is unlikely to occur 
in fields like HC and HE, which are characterised by strong institutionalised 
traditions (Pinheiro et al. 2016). Instead, following HI, we are much more likely 
to observe gradual, subtle institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), with 
existing (“old”) institutions and rules of action co-existing with “new” features 
resulting from reforms and restructuring attempts (cf. Gornitza & Maassen, 
2000).  
When exploring changes in de- (re)centralising reform-dynamics, we apply 
the seminal work of Streeck & Thelen (2005) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010), 
consisting of four alternative modes of institutional change, namely: 1) Dis-
placement: which means the removal of existing rules and institutions and the 
creation of new ones; 2) Layering: where new institutions are added to the exist-
ing (old) ones; 3) Drift: when old institutions are no longer capable of handling 
new situations because of change in the institutional environment; 4) Conver-
sion: when rules formally exist, but are interpreted, acted on and applied in new 
ways.  As alluded to earlier, our analysis focuses on four key dimensions that 
were selected since they match our understanding of the reform dynamics that 
have taken place in HC and HE, thus providing a platform for comparisons. The 
first dimension, structural changes, relates to whether operational responsibility 
is allocated to central or local government, and how changes in manage-
ment/leadership and/or changes in formal structures (e.g. mergers) can contribute 
to the centralisation of decisions. Secondly, we investigate the impact of changes 
in standard operating procedures and guidelines. Thirdly, performance pertains 
to the process of monitoring the effects (e.g. as regards quality). Finally, we 
analyse how changes in financing impact tendencies towards either centralisation 
or decentralisation.  
 
Case descriptions   
Nordic health care 
 
Norway 
The hospital sector in Norway can historically be described, along with the 
equivalents in the other Scandinavian countries, as a decentralised system. In 
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1975, 19 county councils had responsibility for steering the hospitals spread out 
across the country. This was the heyday of the decentralised hospital model, 
which can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. Throughout mod-
ern history, Norwegian local communities have been somewhat “avant-garde” 
when it comes to new initiatives in health and welfare, a phenomenon labelled 
‘welfare localism’ (Grønlie, 2006). When hospitals were first established in the 
early 1900s, they materialised as a result of local initiatives and enterprises in 
tight cooperation with civic society (NGOs), committed district doctors and 
small towns. However, the politically decentralised system, which later mani-
fested itself in the form of the county council system, experienced latent tensions 
and conflicts regarding the management of hospitals (Byrkjeflot & Neby, 2008). 
In the 1990s, the counties became overburdened with political debates, and in-
creasing demand for better hospital services combined with growing hospital 
budget deficits acted as key reform drivers (Berg, 2006).  
In 2002, a centralising hospital reform was launched to overcome the steer-
ing problems and growing budget deficits. Ownership was handed over from the 
counties to the state, with hospitals becoming autonomous state health enterpris-
es. In many respects, a heavy centralising pendulum has changed the Norwegian 
hospital sector in the last 15 years. In 1999, the country’s hospital structure con-
sisted of a total of 54 hospitals. Fifteen years later, these had been merged into 
18 health enterprises serving four health enterprise regions (Pinheiro, 
Aarrevaara, Berg, Geschhwind & Torjesen, 2017). Contrary to the situation prior 
to the reform, the boards of health enterprises are not political bodies but profes-
sional boards held at arm’s length, as it were, from the owner, the Ministry of 
Health and Care (Magnussen, Vrangbæk, Martinussen & Frich, 2016). The 
boards are responsible for setting up the budget and delivering specialist health 
care services to the population in a specific area. In the wake of the health enter-
prise reform, the state has enforced “a tight grip” on the hospital sector in the 
form of enhanced centralised steering, control and accountability systems: de-
tailed reporting and budget requirements, activity based funding, performance 
management, and so on (Kjekshus, Byrkjeflot & Torjesen, 2013). Central gov-
ernment has achieved greater control over funding through the use of semi-hard 
budget constraints and a stronger control of adherence (Magnussen, 2011). Nev-
ertheless, hospitals continued to overspend, and the government launched a new 
health reform in 2009, the so-called ‘Coordination Reform’ (Romøren, Torjesen 
& Landmark, 2011). The latter decentralised some services (e.g. for the elderly 
and chronically ill), and tried to change the dominating logic from a hospital-
centred focus on ‘cure’ into a new logic substantiated on ‘integrated care’ (Tor-
jesen, Kvåle & Kiland, 2011).  
From 2012 onwards, some tasks (local medical services, dental health, etc) 
have been transferred from the state-owned hospitals to local authorities, but the 
latter were forced to establish mandatory network governance structures with the 
state health enterprises (Torjesen & Vabo, 2014). Empowering local authorities 
to take greater responsibility in HC is further supported by an ongoing municipal 
merger reform (Askim, Klausen & Vabo, 2016). The Norwegian government is 
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taking a comprehensive repertoire of governance mechanisms into use, i.e. man-
datory governance networks, clinical pathways descriptions, quality monitoring, 
performance standards and earmarked grants. Since Norwegian municipalities 
lack the ability to collect taxes, financing primary health depends largely on 
central government grants and the allocation of tax revenues to the local authori-
ties (Byrkjeflot & Neby, 2008). The historically strong decentralised traditions 
have been contested as the government has enacted reforms to re-centralise 
steering and control in the hospital sector (Bykjeflot & Guldbrandsøy, 2012), but 
also by using softer means of governance in the primary health care sector (Tor-
jesen and Vabo, 2014). This process, however, is laden with tensions and con-
tradictions. The health enterprises currently suffer from low levels of legitimacy 
(Kvåle & Torjesen, 2014), and there is a growing demand to reorganise the hos-
pitals back to regional political administrative bodies (Rommetveit, Opedal, 
Stigen & Vrangbæk, 2014). However, a national committee delivered a report to 
the Norwegian parliament in December 2016 after assessing alternative models 
for organising the future hospital sector. The majority in the committee are in 
favour of continuing the existing model with four regional health enterprises, 
which means that central management of the Norwegian hospital sector is likely 
here to stay.2 
In short, we observe two distinct trajectories. Strong central oversight and 
steering is unfolding in the hospital sector, while steps for administrative and 
operational decentralisation (from higher to lower local authorities) is taken 
regarding certain health care tasks. This however does not necessarily mean we 
are observing a decentralising movement in Norwegian health policy per se. 
Current dynamics are more about the implementation of state regulated health 
policy (in both secondary- and primary care) where the state is using mandatory 
network governance measures in tandem with tight financial budget monitoring 
and procedural adherence.   
 
Denmark 
Danish HC was originally developed as a hybrid system, based on sickness funds 
and locally managed public provision. In 1970, a major reform changed the 
system to a public, integrated health system with the counties as the main gov-
ernance units for hospitals, general practitioners and practicing specialists. Most 
hospitals were owned by these counties, while general and specialist practices 
remained privately owned but subject to public planning and operating under 
general contracts with the counties. The sickness funds were abolished, and HC 
financing became tax-based through a combination of county and state taxation 
(Olejaz et al., 2012). State taxation was redistributed to the counties as block 
grants. This system of financing continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but 
the economic downturn and the subsequent problems for public finances made it 
necessary to develop governance structures to strengthen control of expenditure 
and performance in the public sector. Due to the decentralised nature of many 
welfare services, the main instrument became the introduction of negotiated 
agreements (containing target levels for expenditure in the municipalities and 
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regions as well as policy objectives and new initiatives) between the state, the 
counties and the municipalities. These agreements were linked to the national 
budget, as the formal allocation mechanism. This structure worked relatively 
well as a coordinating mechanism in the 1980s, but budget deficits remained a 
problem and state level actors were often frustrated by the independence of re-
gions and municipalities and their occasional hesitancy to comply with new 
policy initiatives. This frustration, combined with an overall ambition to 
strengthen the steering capacity in the sector, fuelled several developments. First, 
the introduction of a Danish version of the DRG3 system enabled more detailed 
monitoring and control of performance (Byrkjeflot & Torjesen, 2010). This was 
used in discussions with the counties and as a way to foster transparency about 
the relative performance of the different regions and hospitals. It also paved the 
way for experiments with activity-based payment schemes within the counties. 
Secondly, a major reform of the administrative structure was agreed in 2004 and 
implemented in 2007. The reform affected the tasks, financing and administra-
tive structures of counties and municipalities. Within HC, the most important 
elements were: a) mergers of the previous 271 municipalities into 98 new and 
larger municipalities, with stronger roles in providing local health services, reha-
bilitation and health promotion; and b) mergers of the previous 13 counties into 
five new regions, with HC as their main responsibility. The new regions were 
not allowed to levy their own taxation, with the majority of HC financing being 
centralised to the state level. In spite of this centralisation, at the national level 
there was a continued feeling that the regions needed stronger incentives to in-
crease their activity and stay within budgets. This led to the introduction of an 
activity-based payment scheme, whereby the regions had to reach a pre-
determined baseline activity level in order to receive full payment from the state. 
On top of this scheme, in 2012, formal legislation with automatic sanctions for 
budget deficits were introduced. All in all, these changes in the financing and 
payment schemes imply a significant centralising shift in the balance of power in 
the economic governance relations between the state and the decentralised levels 
of regions and municipalities.  
The administrative reform also strengthened state influence as regards the 
location and development of HC infrastructure. The role of the Danish Health 
Authority (DHA) was strengthened in terms of its planning capacity and ability 
to intervene at the regional level. Allocation of funds to the regions became 
contingent on the development and approval of new hospitals adhering to guide-
lines from the state and subject to DHA’s approval. This has enabled the DHA to 
impose its preference for mergers and collections of specialties, and it clearly 
demonstrated the shifting power balance in the sector. Another indication of 
stronger state level power is the development of standards, guidelines and ‘pa-
tient pathway descriptions’ by the national authorities. This is further reinforced 
by the implementation of quality monitoring instruments focusing on service and 
clinical quality. Waiting times and patient satisfaction are routinely measured 
and published. Clinical quality is monitored in databases and through register-
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based analyses, with some of these measures becoming available for the direct 
comparison (benchmarking) of different hospital departments.  
 
Table 1: Historical trends in the governance of the hospital sector 
 NORWAY DENMARK 
 Decentralised 
Model 
(1970s-1990s)* 
Centralisation 
trends 
(2000->) 
Decentralised 
Model 
(1970s-1990s) 
Centralisation 
trends 
(2000->) 
Financing 
-Tax collec-
tion 
-General 
budget 
 
-Allocation to 
regions** 
 
Regions/ coun-
ties 
State – soft 
budget con-
straints 
Block grants 
 
State 
State – semi-hard 
budget con-
straints 
Activity based 
financing (30-
40%) and block 
grants (60-70%) 
 
Regions 
Regions/state: 
soft budget 
constraints 
Block grants 
 
State 
State: (Budget 
law with hard 
constraints) 
Block grants 
subject to 
activity targets 
Structure 
-Ownership 
-Infrastruc-
ture planning 
 
 
 
 
-Speciali-
sation 
 
 
 
Leadership & 
Management 
 
Region 
Region/counties 
National hospi-
tal planning 
 
 
 
Regions w/state 
input 
 
 
 
Dual (nurse and 
physician) 
administrative 
structures 
 
State owned 
enterprises 
(mergers of 
hospitals) 
Stronger role for 
the state 
 
Transfer of 
certain tasks 
from state (health 
enterprises) to 
municipalities 
from 2012 
 
Unitary man-
agement from 
2000 
 
Regions 
Regions (few 
mergers) 
 
 
Regions 
w/state input 
 
 
 
Variations of 
“troika” man-
agement 
w/general, 
medical and 
nursing man-
agers 
 
Regions 
Regional plans 
subject to state 
approval (mer-
gers and new 
hospitals) 
Stronger role 
for the state 
 
 
 
Unitary man-
agement with 
central struc-
tures in many 
hospitals 
Procedures 
-Standards/ 
guidelines and 
control of 
procedural 
adherence 
 
State (Norwe-
gian Health 
Authority), but 
with limited 
control of 
adherence 
 
State (Norwegian 
Health Authori-
ty), with higher 
density and 
stronger control 
of adherence 
 
State (Danish 
Health Author-
ity), but with 
limited control 
of adherence 
 
State (Danish 
Health Authori-
ty), with higher 
density and 
stronger control 
of adherence 
Performan-
ce criteria 
-Activity level 
(pa-
tients/students
) 
 
-Quality 
measures and 
monitoring 
 
No activity 
targets 
Limited quality 
measures.   
 
Monitoring 
mostly by 
regions.   
 
 
Activity based 
financing. Wait-
ing time guaran-
tees 
 
State: monitoring 
and publication 
of service and 
clinical quality 
 
No activity 
targets 
 
 
Monitoring 
and interven-
tions mostly by 
regions 
 
Activity targets 
linked to eco-
nomic incen-
tives. Waiting 
time guarantees 
State: monitor-
ing and publica-
tion of service 
and clinical 
quality 
* Time periods are approximate as it is a gradual development.  
** Regional variation in the mix of activity based payments and global budgets to hospitals 
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An interesting development in the governance of HC performance was the deci-
sion to reorganise the national quality control system in 2016. Under the new 
system, the regions will be benchmarked against set targets on an annual basis, 
but are otherwise free to develop their own local quality assurance systems to 
support their activities. This can be seen as an example of decentralising opera-
tional power, while centralising the power to set the overall direction. 
 
Nordic higher education 
 
Norway 
Up to the early 1990s, the then (4) publicly run universities enjoyed considerable 
levels of autonomy, including over student numbers. A 1991 white paper to 
Parliament proposed changes in the way in which the entire system was coordi-
nated, in the form of a ‘Network Norway’, focusing on stronger coordination and 
oversight by the Ministry. The government enhanced control over substantive 
matters, namely, the location of the various types of study programmes being 
offered by universities. In turn, universities were given strengthened autonomy 
over procedural issues, i.e. deciding how these study programmes ought to be 
designed and implemented (St.meld. 40 1990-91). In the mid-1990s, a series of 
mandatory mergers involving non-university institutions and a common law 
regulating universities and colleges were enacted. Both measures aimed at en-
hancing the government’s ability to steer an increasingly decentralised, complex 
and fragmented, binary HE system.   
Prior to the early 2000s, the basic funding formula for universities was based 
on an educational component and a research component, with little attention paid 
to efficiency. The expansion in university enrolments throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s, and its associated costs, brought efficiency concerns to the top of the 
policy agenda, alongside quality-related issues (Pinheiro & Antonowicz 2015). 
This set in motion a discussion concerning the need to enact changes at the or-
ganisational level, not least in the leadership structures of universities which 
were thought to be slow in responding to external events. The momentum creat-
ed by the NPM-inspired reforms during the late 1980s and 1990s (Christensen & 
Lægreid 2001), in tandem with three conservative governments (1983-1990), 
made ‘managerialism’ an appealing concept to be applied to the governance of 
Norwegian HE. Rationalisation, bureaucratisation and the professionalisation of 
administrative affairs came to the fore (Gorntizka, Kyvik & Larsen 1998).  
On the administrative front, a number of policy measures increased the au-
tonomy of universities. National responsibility for several academic specialisa-
tions (‘nodes’) was given to a number of institutions during the 1990s. In 1995, a 
new set of regulations for the promotion of university professors (away from the 
Chair-based system and towards a meritocratic one) was approved by Parlia-
ment. The 2003 Quality Reform (QR) strengthened institutional autonomy 
alongside stronger accountability measures and a strengthened emphasis on 
performance (Stensaker 2014). It also set in motion changes in the governance 
and leadership structures of universities, aimed at enhancing their capacity to 
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react to external circumstances by speeding up (centralising) decision making. 
Interestingly, the QR is a product of historical circumstances. Its many elements 
were the result of the concerted efforts (late ’90s/early 2000s) of no less than 
three different governments (two of which were conservative), building on the 
recommendations by the ministerially appointed, yet politically neutral ‘Mjøs 
Commission’. Since 2004, universities have been financially rewarded for hav-
ing both productive students (credit production and on-time graduation), and 
researchers (publication points)). In light of stronger accountability measures, 
the budgetary process has also changed, with universities providing the Ministry 
of Education with an annual report on both results and future plans, which forms 
the basis for annual consultations between the parties (Stensaker 2014).  
Increasing accountability and a focus on quality have resulted in the estab-
lishment of a new, ‘independent’ quality assurance agency (NOKUT), responsi-
ble for accrediting institutions (e.g. after mergers) and programmes (outside the 
university sector). Universities enjoy full freedom to set out new degree pro-
grammes at all levels, with boards at the faculty and university levels acting as 
supervisory bodies. Universities are also responsible for devising and imple-
menting their own system for quality assurance, which requires approval from 
NOKUT. Recruitment procedures are shifting to take into consideration compe-
tences other than scientific publications, such as the ability to attract external 
funding. Universities enjoy greater autonomy over recruitment, and this is mak-
ing HR policy more strategic. Likewise, universities have been awarded greater 
freedoms to choose their internal leadership models (Stensaker 2014). In the so-
called ‘dual-leadership model’, which respects historical traditions, the Rector, 
who also acts as the Chair of the University Board, is elected by the university 
staff and works alongside an appointed Faculty Director responsible for adminis-
trative matters. The alternative model is based on the concept of ‘unitary man-
agement’ (Berg & Pinheiro 2016), with the Rector being appointed by the Uni-
versity Board, which is headed by an external member appointed by the Minis-
try. Finally, as an illustration of the recent trend towards re-centralisation, the 
Ministry has given strong signals that it wants fewer and stronger institutions 
(through mergers), a move towards appointed leaders at all levels and a preva-
lence of external board members. This is an attempt to shake up universities’ 
internal status quo and foster alignment between university strategic priorities 
and the government’s economic and political imperatives.  
 
Denmark  
Patterns of (de)centralisation have changed over time in the Danish university 
sector. In the late 1970s and 1980s the sector was characterised by a high degree 
of centralised control by the state. Student enrolment on educational programmes 
was centrally planned on the basis of forecasts for labour force demand. Separate 
budgets for educational and research activities were allocated directly to the 
faculties. The centralised control regime reflected the shift from a period of 
economic growth to that of economic scarcities, substantiated on a policy logic 
aimed at balancing supply and demand. Political mistrust towards the democratic 
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organisation of decision-making within universities acted as an additional driver 
for the high degree of centralisation (Hansen 2000).  
In the 1990s a management reform introduced external representatives into 
the governing bodies of the universities and at the same time re-introduced in-
creased institutional budgetary autonomy. In addition, control of student enrol-
ment was removed, opening up institution-based decision-making except within 
highly expensive educational programmes like medicine. In the early 2000s, a 
new (rather radical) management reform was introduced. Universities were giv-
en a new status as self-owned institutions with boards with an external majority, 
and the principle of elected leaders was abandoned in favour of appointed ones. 
The role of academic councils shifted from co-decision-makers to merely advi-
sory bodies. Bottom-up decision-making was replaced by top-down strategic 
decisions (Degn & Sørensen, 2012). Organisational autonomy was strengthened, 
as was internal institutional centralisation. The reform reflected a wish to trans-
form universities into ‘strategic actors’ (Whitley 2008).  
The concept of self-owned institutions, however, turned out to be ambiguous 
and a discussion and negotiation about organisational autonomy has been ongo-
ing since 2003. Later, in 2011, universities were given increased autonomy over 
the design of their organisational structures. The top-down leadership model 
remained, but it was no longer mandatory to organise academic activities within 
the classic form of faculties and departments. The topic of ownership of build-
ings has been controversial. In spite of the emphasis on organisational autonomy 
in the rhetoric of the 2003 reform, in subsequent years more issues arrived on the 
centralisation radar. In 2007, an accreditation institution with a very strict mis-
sion was established. Every single existing and newly proposed educational 
programme had to undergo accreditation. Universities were given no mandates 
to develop new educational programmes (Hansen, 2014). In 2007 too, a “forced-
voluntary” merger reform reorganised the university sector. The number of insti-
tutions was reduced and most former governmental research institutes were 
integrated into the universities. The main goals of the merger reform were to 
create synergies and obtain economies of scale (Aagaard, Hansen & Rasmussen, 
2016). However, one may wonder whether a hidden agenda of the reform was to 
make it easier to exercise control from above within the organisational field, e.g. 
by using contracts. With a smaller number of institutions, the costs involved in 
the Ministry negotiating contracts has decreased.  
Financial incentives aimed at increasing student throughput were introduced 
in 2009, followed by new rules demanding that students study full-time. In 2015, 
centrally planned enrolments for fields with high levels of unemployment were 
introduced, alongside a new generation of contract steering using partly compul-
sory goals, e.g. related to quality development and relevancy. Results-based 
funding has become increasingly important. Funding for education has been 
results-based since the 1990s, as universities receive resources for every student 
passing an exam, but the system has been further developed over time. Since 
2010, a bibliometric indicator system (inspired by Norway) has formed a part of 
the funding system for allocating basic resources for research. Although the 
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system only re-allocates a minor portion and only within (and not between) sci-
entific fields, it does affect researchers’ behaviour (Dahler-Larsen, 2012). The 
principles guiding resource allocation in the different funding streams are cen-
trally decided, but the resources are provided for the universities as lump sums, 
hence giving them considerable autonomy over how to distribute them internal-
ly. From 2016 hard budget constrains have been introduced, forcing several 
universities to make staff redundant.   
 
Table 2: Autonomy and centralisation trends in public universities 
 Norway Denmark 
 Organisational 
autonomy 
model 
(1990s ->)* 
Centralising 
governance 
(2000->)* 
Organisation-
al autonomy 
(1990s->)* 
Centralising 
governance 
(2000->)* 
Financing 
-Tax collec-
tion 
-General 
budget 
 
 
-Allocation to 
universities 
 
State 
State (lump 
sum) 
 
 
Based on stu-
dent numbers 
and research 
(but not output) 
 
State 
State (Negotiated 
contracts, com-
bination of lump-
sum and ear-
marked upon 
agreed formula)  
 
Since 2004, 
financially 
rewarded for 
student and  
researcher per-
formance 
 
State 
State (hard 
budget con-
straints) 
 
Some results-
based payment 
introduced in 
1990 (number 
of students 
passing exams) 
 
 
State 
State (lump 
sum, hard 
budgets con-
strains from 
2016) 
 
Results-based 
payment further 
developed 
(students 
passing exams, 
bibliometric 
measures, 
“employability” 
of students) 
Structure 
a) Legal 
-Ownership 
-Location 
-Structure 
(mergers) 
-Speciali-
sation/types 
of study 
programmes 
 
 
b) Leadership 
& Manage-
ment 
 
 
State 
State 
State (no mer-
gers) 
State with 
operational 
discretion at the 
organisational 
level 
 
Internal leaders 
elected by 
academic peers 
(‘primus inter 
pares’) 
 
 
State 
State 
State (voluntary 
mergers under 
increasing pres-
sure) 
Universities 
pushed to devel-
op distinct 
institutional 
profile – selected 
areas 
Hybrid system, 
but increasingly 
moving towards 
top-down ap-
pointments, 
including of 
external actors or 
outsiders (‘man-
agerialism’) 
 
 
State 
State 
State (no 
mergers) 
Universities 
subject to state 
approval 
 
 
Internal lead-
ers elected by 
academic peers 
(‘primus inter 
pares’) 
 
 
(Partially) self-
owned 
State 
State (forced 
voluntary 
mergers) 
Universities 
subject to 
stricter state 
approval and 
accreditation. 
Emphasis on 
“employability” 
 
Internal leaders 
appointed top-
down 
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Procedures 
-Standards/ 
guidelines 
and control 
of procedur-
al adherence 
 
Autonomy to 
establish new 
programmes 
(little over-
sight by state 
agencies) 
 
 
Quality dele-
gated to the 
universities, 
combined with  
increasing, 
supervisory  
role by national 
agency 
(NOKUT) 
Full freedom to 
establish new 
programmes, 
but increasing 
ex-post over-
sight (student 
feed-
back/quality 
control, etc.) 
Mandatory 
(contracts) and 
annual budgets 
 
University 
autonomy 
 
Accreditation 
of new and 
existing study 
programmes 
 
Perfor-
mance 
criteria 
-Activity 
level (pa-
tients/studen
ts) 
 
-Quality 
measures 
and moni-
toring 
 
No output-
based 
measures 
 
University 
autonomy 
 
 
 
 
Credit produc-
tion and on-
time gradua-
tion. Biblio-
metric 
measures of 
researchers 
Stronger em-
phasis on 
‘social impact’ 
of research 
(return on 
public invest-
ments) 
Focus on at-
tracting exter-
nal funds – 
research coun-
cil & EU (en-
hances re-
sources & 
prestige)  
 
 
No activity 
targets 
 
 
University 
autonomy 
 
Activity 
targets linked 
to economic 
incentives.  
 
Bibliometric 
measures 
linked to 
economic 
incentives. 
Exter-
nal/internatio
nal assess-
ments of 
research 
quality. 
University 
contracts with 
quality targets 
*Time periods are approximate as it is a gradual development.  
 
A 2013 reform of the accreditation system will, in the coming years, delegate 
authority to develop new educational programmes to those universities which 
attain an institutional accreditation, meaning that their internal quality assurance 
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systems are approved. However, this delegation of authority is combined with 
re-centralisation, as it is a precondition that the Ministry approves the relevance 
of new programmes. As in Norway, universities now enjoy greater autonomy 
over personnel/HR policy. External committees composed of academic peers are 
still used to assess applicants, but the former system of ranking applicants has 
been abandoned, leaving much more room for managerial decisions. To some 
extent, salaries have also been set free. Finally, although the influence of supra-
national collaboration in the Bologna process as well as in European Union re-
search policy has been increasing, national policies are still very important in 
Danish HE (see also Hansen 2012). Overall, the governance structures in the 
university sector are complex and steadily evolving. The question of the univer-
sities’ organisational autonomy seems to be an ongoing discussion. The concept 
of autonomy is both multi-dimensional and relative.  
To sum up, the Danish case illustrates three fundamental trends. First, an 
ongoing conflict and negotiation between the state and the universities regarding 
organisational autonomy. Second, decentralisation, in the form of increased 
managerial autonomy for universities, has been combined with internally cen-
tralised decision-making structures. In this regard, there appears to be a coupling 
between centralisation and political mistrust in the internal decision-making and 
management structures of universities and, likewise, a coupling between decen-
tralisation and increased trust in internal decision-making and management 
structures. Third, recent decentralising and centralising initiatives have occurred 
parallel to one another. Once again, this situation seems to be explained by the 
economic context, with scarce societal resources in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. 
 
Discussion 
The data presented above show that both sectors have been the target of major 
state led reforms, but the pendulum has not necessarily moved in a single direc-
tion. Change in managerial structures have enhanced autonomy at the local level 
(for universities and hospitals), yet this has been accompanied by stringent 
mechanisms for ex-post control and accountability (cf. Diefenbach 2009).  In 
HC, institutional change is intrinsically linked to field level dynamics such as the 
creation of regions (Denmark) and of health enterprises (Norway). Likewise, in 
HE, wider efforts across Europe associated with both the Bologna process and 
the Lisbon strategy have had significant impacts on the restructuring of the two 
domestic systems.  
Revisiting our adopted typology of institutional change (see table 3 below), 
in both sectors and countries a considerable amount of layering is visible, re-
flecting the importance attributed to path dependencies. More radical (less evolu-
tionary) reforms have also led to the displacement of old mechanisms and insti-
tutions. Examples include; the state take-over of the hospitals in Norway and the 
establishment of regions (replacing counties) in Denmark.  
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Table 3:Mapping institutional change across two organizational fields 
Institutional change*                              
 Health Care (HC) Higher Education (HE) 
Drift Change in managerial structures 
and functions to accommodate 
new demands for competitive 
and entrepreneurial behaviour 
from the institutional context  
 
Stronger roles for municipali-
ties/local governments in health 
care to accommodate the chang-
ing context of the aging popula-
tion and growing long term 
condition needs 
Change in managerial structures, 
from elected to appointed leaders  
 
The prevalent role of external 
actors in strategic decisions  
 
Layering NPM-inspired governance 
combined with professional 
networks and public bureaucra-
cy. Hybrid management with 
professionals, bureaucrats and 
public entrepreneurs  
Fiscal steering, parallel with ex-
post control.  
 
Hybrid combination of elected 
and appointed leaders at some 
institutions and across the system 
(NO) 
Performance funding alongside 
basic formula based on historical 
considerations.  
Bibliometric mechanisms in 
research  
HR policies: decentralisation of 
authority to the universities but at 
the same time increasingly cen-
tralisation of decisions internally 
to university managers 
Ongoing transformation of the 
accreditation system into a system 
combining institutional and pro-
gram accreditation 
Displacement Creating regions (DK) and 
health enterprises (NO) replac-
ing counties. 
 
Mergers and closure of hospi-
tals (DK and NO) 
 
Management reforms: Principle of 
elected leaders abandoned in 
favour of appointed ones 
Collegial bodies substituted by 
committees or boards with exter-
nal actors   
From voluntary to ‘forced volun-
tary’ mergers  
Accreditation systems for oversee-
ing quality (2000-2005) 
Conversion Formal autonomy of re-
gions/regional health enterprises 
but increasing state intervention  
Different understandings of au-
tonomy  
*Legend: 1) Drift: when old institutions are no longer capable of handling new situations because of 
change in the institutional environment; 2) Layering: where new institutions are added to the exist-
ing (old) ones; 3) Displacement: which means the removal of existing rules and institutions and the 
creation of new ones; 4) Conversion: when rules formally exist, but are interpreted and enacted on 
and applied in new ways.  
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The reduction in the number of hospitals and universities through mergers and 
the introduction of new funding structures and quality assurance mechanisms are 
other (less radical) examples. Changes in managerial structures within universi-
ties and hospitals towards the increasing centralisation of decision-making are a 
manifestation of drift tendencies, representing adaptations to changing demands 
in the institutional environment. Finally, different understandings regarding the 
types and degrees of autonomy enjoyed by universities and hospitals in both 
countries suggest the role played by conversion.  
When we consider HC, we observe that the role of the state (as a key agent) 
has been gathering strength in both countries, with respect to structural changes 
in ownership, infrastructure and planning, as well as in managing the sector. 
Instead of reinforcing the continued decentralisation of authority away from 
national governments, state institutions have reversed course and are now seizing 
responsibility for substantive political and fiscal decision-making. It appears 
that, in the near future, only administrative and managerial authority, i.e. day-
today operational decisions, will remain decentralised to lower levels and/or 
within non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In-
creased fiscal pressures, new technological innovations and insatiable public 
demands for more advanced hospital services resulted in a drift of the decentral-
ised hospital sector in both countries in the 1990s. The old institutional arrange-
ments were no longer able to handle the new situation, thus triggering institu-
tional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Hence, the system based on decentral-
ised ownership of the hospitals was replaced by a more centralised sector, owned 
and operated by either the regions (DK) or the state (NO). This process has, in 
turn, led to significant concentration through mergers. Furthermore, the role of 
the state has been considerably strengthened in relation to financial aspects, with 
tighter economic steering of the hospital sector; from soft- to hard- budget, from 
block grants to activity-based financing. As a parallel trend, one can observe 
increases in procedural adherence in the form of tighter professional procedures, 
standard guidelines, as well as performance criteria imposed and monitored by 
the state’s health authorities. In short, in both Denmark and Norway the central 
government increasingly determines the structure, organisation and financing of 
the HC system.  
In the realm of HE, the state’s role and steering ambitions have also changed 
significantly. In both countries, we observe that universities have become subject 
to stricter state approval and accreditation rules, in the same manner as the pub-
lic hospitals. In addition, one can identify similar trends in the adoption of (new) 
centralised forms of management and governance structures, which, on the 
whole, tend to concentrate strategic decisions in the hands of a smaller group of 
individuals, alongside the strengthened influence of external actors over univer-
sity affairs. In short, universities are expected to respond more swiftly and stra-
tegically to societal demands, with the state and its various agencies acting as a 
watchdog. Line or unitary management has enhanced coordination efforts by 
centralising authority and ensuring that key individuals are accountable for the 
decisions made. This represents a significant break from the past and the notion 
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of democratic participation in the form of a ‘community of equals’ (Olsen 2007), 
where accountability was, first and foremost, to one’s academic peers. 
The aforementioned developments point to two interlinked dimensions that 
are often not taken into account when devising new policy measures. First, the 
need to pay attention to cross-sector dynamics; i.e. the fact that changes in one 
policy sphere enable or constrain changes at other levels (Pinheiro et al. 2014). 
Second, and related to this first factor, developments at different policy levels, 
e.g. supranational (EU) or regional (Nordics), show the need to take into consid-
eration multi-level governance arrangements (Piattoni 2010), whilst attempting 
to interpret and predict reform trajectories and their subsequent effects, both 
intended and otherwise. As discussed earlier, HE dynamics at the national level 
have been strongly influenced by EU-wide initiatives, while in HC the role of 
local government and the various challenges facing municipalities should not be 
underestimated.  
Gornitzka et al. (2007) have argued that the complex interplay between na-
tional and supranational dynamics is resulting in the search for a new ‘social 
contract’, brokered via the state, and existing between public welfare providers 
and society. The ‘old’ contract was substantiated on mutual trust, ensuring insti-
tutions both autonomy and legitimacy to go about their business in ways that 
were relatively decoupled from major external events. It also meant that institu-
tions like universities and hospitals enjoyed considerable degrees of both sub-
stantive and procedural autonomy (Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 2005). In contrast, 
the basis of the new, emerging contract lies in public providers having to con-
stantly demonstrate (‘accountability regime’) that their internal structures, poli-
cies and activities are a direct reflection of the various demands being imposed 
upon them from a multiplicity of external stakeholder groups, the government 
included. In such circumstances, the state tends to enlarge the degree of proce-
dural autonomy (means) enjoyed by providers, whilst controlling the types of 
outputs (ends) that are thought to be desirable from a political, economic and 
social standpoint.  
Rather than being conceived as dichotomies, centralising and decentralising 
tendencies in the governance of modern welfare systems should be approached 
as two sides of the same coin. Devolution in certain areas, which is more often 
linked to issues of procedural autonomy, such as managerial responsibilities, 
often implies strengthened centralisation in other domains (e.g. substantive as-
pects, like goals and results), considered to be strategic from the perspective of 
the central government (Schmidtlein & Berdahl 2005). Historically, this tenden-
cy towards re-centralising activities is particularly acute in periods of financial 
stringency, such as the one caused by the 2008 financial crisis. This suggests a 
return to a stronger state-centred supervision regime. This phenomenon is 
aligned with broader trends (other countries and sectors) towards the rise of the 
New Weberian State (Politt & Bouckaert, 2011), and the return of the bureau-
cratic mode of governance (Olsen, 2006). What is more, decentralisation and 
centralisation are tightly intertwined. Enhanced levels of autonomy for both HE 
institutions and HC providers have resulted in greater centralisation of decision-
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making within universities and hospitals, through managerialism (du Gay, 1996). 
Yet, given the historical (path-dependent) nature of both sectors and the fact that 
certain features (e.g. professional autonomy) are highly institutionalised and thus 
resistant to change, the infusion of a managerial logic has led to the rise of hy-
brid-steering and governance approaches (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000; Berg & 
Pinheiro, 2016). 
 
Conclusions  
In this paper we provide evidence that centralisation and decentralisation pat-
terns across HC and HE occur in tandem. Both hospitals and universities have, in 
the last decade or so, been given a greater degree of procedural autonomy whilst 
suffering a loss of freedom as regards more substantive matters. Growing cen-
tralisation is intrinsically linked to external calls for increasing efficiency, re-
sponsiveness and accountability. A major consequence of NPM-inspired re-
forms, based on “soft” steering mechanisms and accountability regimes, is that 
both universities and hospitals are now striving to become more strategic organi-
sations accountable for their own actions and responsible for their own destinies 
(Whitley, 2008; Ramirez, Byrkjeflot & Pinheiro, 2016). 
The jury is still out on whether such reform processes have enhanced effec-
tiveness or not, since they have also led to a rise in internal transaction costs due 
to the increasing need to coordinate activities across sub-units and managerial 
levels, as well as reporting to the various governmental agencies. More recently, 
and as result of the financial and fiscal pressures facing the Nordics, partly re-
sulting from the decline in oil prices (Norway) and global competitiveness 
(Denmark), there are signs of policy convergence in the direction of more market 
(output-based) mechanisms on the one hand, and new measures to ensure greater 
oversight and accountability on the other. These two sectors reflect the current 
dynamics within the Nordic region, where societal (macro level) pressures to 
reform the welfare state, beginning in the late 1980s, are part and parcel of the 
changing nature of the social pact between the state and society when it comes to 
the provision of public services.  
An added value of such comparative studies across sectors and national ju-
risdictions lies in the recognition that, despite similar reform dynamics and 
tendencies towards greater centralisation, historical specificities and institution-
alised features associated with each sector do result in particular combinations 
(hybrids) and a series of unintended effects. Going forward, we appeal for more 
comparative studies, preferably using mixed methods and a longitudinal design, 
as a means of assessing the circumstances under which certain domains of policy 
(funding, management, quality, etc) are either centralised or decentralised. In 
addition, we appeal to new quantitative insights on the effects – as regards per-
formance, trust, coordination, long-term outcomes, etc – the above measures 
have had at the system level. 
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Notes 
 
1 The authors distinguish between substantive (‘what’) and procedural (‘how’) types of autonomy. 
Increases in one type do not necessarily entail increases in the others, and vice versa. 
2 Report to the Storting no 25 (2016) 
3 The DRG system (Diagnosis Related Groups) classifies patients into over 500 groups, and can be 
used for many purposes: reimbursement, cost control, benchmarking, and performance management. 
